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Abstract
In this thesis, we consider the problem of designing real-time traffic routing systems
in urban areas. Optimal dynamic routing for multiple passengers is known to be
computationally hard due to its combinatorial nature. To overcome this difficulty,
we propose a novel mechanism called User-Centric Dynamic Pricing (UCDP) based
on recent advances in algorithmic mechanism design. The mechanism allows for
congestion-free traffic in general road networks with heterogeneous users, while satis-
fying each user's travel preference. The mechanism first informs whether a passenger
should use public transportation or the road network. In the latter case, a passenger
reports his maximum accepted travel time with a lower bound announced publicly by
the road authority. The mechanism then assigns the passenger a path that matches
with his preference given the current traffic condition in the network. The proposed
mechanism introduces a fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP) problem with a
special structure, thus enabling polynomial time computation of path allocation that
maximizes the sequential social surplus and guarantees fairness among passengers.
The tolls of paths are then computed according to marginal cost payments. We show
that reporting true preference is a weakly dominant strategy. The performance of
the proposed mechanism is demonstrated on several simulated routing experiments
in comparison to user equilibrium and system optimum.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Road traffic congestion is a serious problem in contemporary metropolitan areas. Ac-
cording to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), traffic congestion costs the
United States $200 billion annually in wasted fuel and lost time [1]. Remarkably,
DOT estimates that drivers in metropolitan areas spend one-quarter of total annual
travel time in congested roads [1]. In the effort of reducing this significant amount
of unpleasant and inefficient travel time, transportation researchers have developed
many instruments and strategies aiming to evenly distribute vehicles on the net-
works. In this thesis, we focus on designing real-time traffic routing systems that
use congestion pricing as an efficient method to alleviate travel delays in urban ar-
eas. Since transportation networks are complex large-scale systems, researchers are
often concerned with thecomputational complexity of the problem [2]. In addition,
the unpredictable behavior of drivers make it extremely difficult to require them to
follow the routing systems. The efficiency of the systems as well as fairness among
passengers also pose great challenges to researchers [3,4]. Therefore, in this work, we
provide a novel game-theoretic approach to construct a dynamic congestion pricing
mechanism that aims to address the above challenges.
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1.1 Motivations
Intelligent and scalable traffic routing for large cities has been an active research area
in recent years. Many route guidance systems have been used to assist drivers in
path-choice decision making by simply computing the shortest path from a source
to a destination, regardless of the changing conditions of roadways [5]. More ad-
vanced systems are proposed to recommend routes to users after performing some
computations from a macroscopic point of view [6]. In these systems, the authors
consider static flows of multiple homogeneous users on the networks and attempt
to compute an a priori distribution of the users on the road networks. This static
traffic assignment (STA) problem can be solved by using the Wardrop principle [7]
or Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions to achieve a user equilibrium (UE) solution or
a social optimal (SO) solution, respectively. At the UE state, each user selects his
fastest route, while at the SO state, the total travel time of all drivers is minimized.
Although SO is more preferable for road authorities, it encounters an unfairness is-
sue as some users are assigned longer paths to allow for the efficiency of the entire
system. In addition, STA models assume that traffic demand is constant over time,
thus they are unable to represent the variation of traffic flows during short specific
periods of a day such as peak hours [8]. This limitation along with the unfairness
issue have raised a question of STA tractability in real-world deployments. To tackle
this, Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA) models have been developed by many re-
searchers to capture the peaked nature of travel demand and the time-varying traffic
flows [9-13]. Approaches to DTA problems can be classified into two main groups:
analytical approaches (mathematical programming, optimal control, variational in-
equality) and simulation-based approaches [2]. Although current DTA models can
describe the reality more accurately than the static models, these DTA models are
either mathematically intractable or heavily dependent on simulation, thus computa-
tionally inefficient when dealing with large-scale traffic networks. More importantly,
they are still unable to manage the system optimality and the above unfairness prob-
lem simultaneously.
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Thus, in [4] and [3], the authors propose the constrained system optimum (CSO)
to capture the above two aspects. In their CSO models, they consider a traffic assign-
ment pattern for homogeneous users that minimizes the total travel time subject to a
fairness constraint via a single tolerance factor. However, this pre-specified tolerance
factor does not truly reflect fairness for individual traveler whose preference and pur-
pose are unrevealed. In addition, congestion can occur when the tolerance factor is
not properly chosen even if the road network is capable of supporting congestion-free
traffic at the SO state. Furthermore, the authors do not consider dynamic traffic flows
and the selfish behavior of rational passengers. More precisely, a rational passenger
would not use the routing system and follow its recommendation if such compliance
does not provide him with a tangible gain. Apparently, these limitations have pre-
vented a direct application of the model in real-world situations.
In fact, to partially restrain the selfish behavior of travelers that can lead to traffic
congestion during rush hours, tolling systems such as Electronic Road Pricing (ERP)
in Singapore have been deployed [14]. The positive effects of the ERP system on
spreading peak-hour travel demand are verified in [15] and [16]. At the time of this
writing, pre-computed time-varying tolls within a day are used to affect passengers'
behavior. However, this time-varying tolling scheme does not enable congestion-free
traffic flows because urban traffic also varies from day to day. A similar variable price
scheme based on the evolutionary approach is proposed in [17] to enable congestion-
free traffic when travel demand is static. In this scheme, passengers will decide to
travel or stay at home permanently after a long adjustment process in response to
variable tolls set by a road authority. Not only is the convergence process slow when
the demand is static, but the traffic flow is also unstable when the demand is dynamic.
As an attempt to compute flow-dependent tolls in dynamic environments, the work
presented in [18] proposes a toll design method that combines road pricing with DTA.
The authors formulate the problem as a bi-level programming problem, in which the
road pricing model represents the upper-level decision making process, and the DTA
model represents the lower-level counterpart. The resulting formulation is an NP-hard
problem [18]. One possible method to obtain a locally optimal solution suggested by
15
the author is to combine grid search for the upper-level optimization and simulation
for the DTA in an iterative procedure. However, such a method scales poorly with the
size of the network and does not provide insightful understanding of the properties
of obtained solutions for further improvement. We emphasize that all the mentioned
pricing schemes have not addressed the unfairness issue among individuals.
Therefore, in recent years, many researchers have adopted a game-theoretic ap-
proach to handle the above difficulties from the microscopic perspective [19,20]. Re-
cent advances in algorithmic mechanism design [21] provide a promising approach to
incentivize rational participants, or players, to cooperate with the system in order to
reach desirable outcomes. This approach motivates players to disclose their private
information. As usually done in market mechanism design [22], designers aim to con-
struct a mechanism that has individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility
(IC) properties. The former means that players do not suffer any loss when they
use the system, and the latter means revealing truthful information is in their best
interest. In algorithmic mechanism design, besides the IR and IC properties, design-
ers also concern about computational complexity when computing an allocation rule
and a payment rule for intended outcomes [23]. The key technical difficulties lie in
the combinatorial nature of the allocation rule and the interweaving relationship of
allocation rules and payment rules.
In our case, passengers can be viewed as players in a routing game created by the
interaction among passengers and the road authority. Mechanism design for routing
games have been studied extensively in computer networks [24-36] while very few
works have been done for urban transportation networks [37-39]. Although both
types of networks share some similar modeling aspects, inherent characteristics of the
two types of networks differ substantially. In particular, in computer networks, as
discussed in [40], utility functions of users are unknown to the network; and even
if the utility functions are known, there is no central authority that knows all the
link capacities and network topology. In addition, autonomous systems (AS) in the
network can run any routing algorithm that benefits them the most. Therefore, we
can hardly simulate flows for the entire computer networks such as the Internet.
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In contrast, in transportation networks, passenger utility functions can be modeled
quite accurately based on regression analysis [41]. In addition, we can monitor real-
time traffic flows via sensor networks [42-45] or community based mobile navigation
applications such as Waze [46]. Thus, current models and results in computer network
routing cannot be applied in urban transportation network routing.
One of the most related works in mechanism design for urban transportation
routing is [38]. In their work, the authors propose a day-to-day auction mechanism
in which a road user has to bid everyday to purchase a bundle of network permits
that allow him to use his preferred path. Although this approach can reduce the
computational complexity of finding an allocation rule for a single OD pair network,
it is not clear how to determine the allocation rule for a general network with multiple
OD pairs. The day-to-day auction mechanism is also not practical to be implemented
for real-world road networks due to several reasons. The mechanism requires users
to go through a bidding process before being able to use the paths, while in reality,
road users often needs an instantaneous route choice decision. Furthermore, although
the authors show that truthfully reporting the valuation of several bundles of permits
is a dominant strategy for each user, it is difficult for users to determine their true
valuation.
To address the limitations in previous work, we explore a novel approach to over-
come the computational complexity and to satisfy game-theoretic requirements of
the transportation network routing problem. In this thesis, we propose a novel mech-
anism called User-Centric Dynamic Pricing (UCDP) based on recent advances in
algorithmic mechanism design to allocate heterogeneous classes of users with paths
that satisfy their travel preferences. Unlike other approaches that attempt to compute
the path allocation for all drivers at the same time, the UCDP mechanism considers
drivers in sequence. This idea helps to reduce the computational complexity of the
problem. The mechanism is applicable, for example, in one-way car rental systems,
or mobility-on-demand systems [47] where fleets of autonomous cars [48] are used in
future cities to pick up and deliver passengers [49]. In the mechanism, these services
are designed to work with public transportation systems.
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1.2 Problem Statement and Objectives
We consider general road networks with dynamic flows of heterogeneous users. The
UCDP mechanism is designed as follows. When a new passenger arrives at an origin
node, he receives information from a road authority on the current network condition.
The authority either suggests him to use public transportation if the network is about
to be congested or provides him with the minimum travel time required to complete
his trip. In the latter case, the passenger then reports his maximum tolerated travel
time that is not less than the minimum travel time announced by the authority.
Based on the current traffic condition in the network, the mechanism then offers the
passenger a path to his destination.
Our objective is to assign each passenger a path that matches with his travel time
constraint while maximizing sequential social surplus when this passenger joins the
network. Importantly, we want to ensure that passengers have no incentive to lie
about their preferences, and under our path assignment, congestion does not hap-
pen in the network. The UCDP mechanism takes into account the fairness concern
when allocating paths to travelers. The tolls of paths are computed according to the
marginal cost pricing principle.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis has four main contributions. The first two contributions describe impor-
tant properties of the novel UCDP mechanism. The third contribution is the impact
of the work to the transportation research community, and the last contribution
presents interesting future work for practical deployments.
First, the mechanism is user-centric in the sense that it considers both passengers'
preference and fairness among individuals. At the same time, the mechanism can
achieve maximum sequential social surplus, i.e. the mechanism is efficient. We also
prove that reporting true preference is a weakly dominant strategy of each passenger,
and the mechanism never transfers positive amount of money to passengers.
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Second, the mechanism introduces a new fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP)
problem with a special structure that enables polynomial time computation of path
allocation. Therefore, we can handle general networks having multiple OD pairs with
dynamic flows of heterogeneous users in a computationally efficient way.
Third, to the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first in the transportation
literature that considers general road networks with dynamic flows of heterogeneous
users and addresses system efficiency, fairness among passengers as well as computa-
tional complexity issues at the same time.
Fourth, this thesis lays a foundation for future work on designing distributed mech-
anisms for optimal traffic routing. In particular, we envision a large-scale network
consisting of mobile users who not only share real-time traffic information but also
collaborate with each other to achieve social-optimal traffic flows through our future
distributed mechanisms.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth review of related works in road traffic rout-
ing and challenges arising from real-world deployments. Due to the multi-
disciplinary nature of the problem, the review includes ideas and results from
several fields ranging from transportation, economics to algorithm design. We
first present traditional approaches such as static and dynamic traffic assign-
ment as well as congestion pricing schemes in practice. We then discuss new
game-theoretic approaches including mechanism design and algorithmic mecha-
nism design, as they promisingly overcome limitations of traditional approaches.
The discussion also highlights our motivation for adopting the algorithmic mech-
anism design approach in this thesis. Finally, we review VCG mechanism and
important shortest path algorithms as a preparation step for our problem for-
mulation and approach in the next chapters.
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" Chapter 3 develops the formal problem formulation to the optimal traffic rout-
ing problem using our game-theoretic approach. We first provide preliminary
notations, definitions and assumptions. We then formulate a model for a general
network with dynamic traffic flows of heterogeneous travelers. We then focus
on describing our User-Centric Dynamic Pricing (UCDP) Mechanism in detail.
* Chapter 4 presents our approach to design an allocation rule and a payment
rule, which are two important components in our mechanism. The allocation
rule assigns a path to each passenger and is formulated as a constrained shortest
path problem. The payment rule calculates the toll that each passenger pays
to use his assigned path. Most importantly, this chapter presents two theorems
with proofs showing that the mechanism has incentive compatibility and no-
positive transfer properties.
" Chapter 5 develops algorithms that are used to allocate paths and compute
tolls in real-time. First, we shows how to simulate a network state at each
time instant. We then present an algorithm to determine minimum travel times
announced by a road authority. Subsequently, we describe an algorithm for
computing dynamic path allocation and dynamic tolls.
* Chapter 6 demonstrates the performance of the proposed mechanism through
two simulated routing experiments. In the first experiment, we simulate the
UCDP mechanism on a parallel-link network with one OD pair. We then
compare the network performance under the UCDP mechanism with user-
equilibrium and social-optimal performance. In the second experiment, we
consider a general network with multiple OD pairs. We show how the road
authority uses the UCDP mechanism to manage traffic flows when road condi-
tions change over time.
* Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarizing the motivation and objectives of
this thesis, the research conducted in this thesis as well as the key contributions.
This chapter also discusses several interesting directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this section, we extend the review in Section 1.1 to provide a thorough literature
review of road traffic routing and challenges in real-world deployments. Due to the
multi-disciplinary nature of the problem, this chapter presents important results in
related fields ranging from transportation, economics to algorithm design. In particu-
lar, Section 2.1 first reviews the fundamental diagram that describes characteristics of
traffic flows at the macroscopic level. A detailed description of Greenshields model for
the fundamental diagram will also be included in this section, since it will be applied
in our UCDP mechanism. Subsequently, Section 2.2 presents static and dynamic traf-
fic assignment models, which have been widely used to understand the phenomenon
of congestion and its causes. We then introduce the idea of congestion pricing in
Section 2.3, which is based on the underlying economics of transportation systems to
alleviate congestion. We also present several congestion pricing schemes in practice
and relevant research. To further understand the selfish behavior of drivers, and the
interaction between drivers and the road authority from a game-theoretic point of
view, a brief review of game theory is then provided in Section 2.4. In particular,
this section focuses on reviewing mechanism design, a sub-field of game theory, and
its applications in previous works. In addition, a more advanced approach called
algorithmic mechanism design is presented to address computational tractability and
scalability arising from the mechanism design approach. For better understanding of
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our payment rule explained in Chapter 4, a detailed description of Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism is also included in this section. Finally, Section 2.5 reviews
important shortest path algorithms that are the building blocks for computing the
allocation rule and payment rule in our proposed mechanism in Chapter 5. The set of
rich results presented here will be incorporated in our novel game-theoretic approach
to tackle the optimal dynamic routing problem.
2.1 The Fundamental Diagram of Traffic Flow
The fundamental diagram characterizes the relationships among three macroscopic
variables of traffic flow on a road segment including average density k, average flow q
and average speed u. The average density k reflects the number of vehicles per length
unit of the road, and average flow q represents the number of vehicles that passes a
certain point per unit of time [50]. Under static conditions such as long roads and
long time periods, the average speed u can be calculated based on the fundamental
relation of traffic flow theory as follows:
q = uk. (2.1)
The (k, q) curve that expresses the relationship between flow and traffic density is
called the fundamental diagram, since it represents all the three variables. The fun-
damental diagram can be derived by plotting field data points and finding a best fit
curve for these data points. For example, Immers et al. observed and measured flow
and mean speed on a three-lane motorway during one minute [50]. Their observation
points are illustrated in Fig. 2-1.
Research on the fundamental diagram began in 1933, when Greenshields calibrated
traffic flow, traffic density and speed by using a photographic measurement method
and then derived a mathematical model for the fundamental diagram [51, 52]. As
shown in Fig. 2-2(a), in the Greenshields model, he postulated a linear relationship
between speed and traffic density, in which speed declines linearly with traffic density,
22
U
(km/hour)
100
80
60
0-
-- 0
0 '
40--
20--
0 -
0
q
(veh/hou
60(
50(
40(
30
20C
10c
U
r)
0
0
I -
i'
a8 0
- - ' -
50 100 150
k (veh/km)
(a)
0 -
0
0
0
0 5
e.
0 0 0 * %
0
-H-
0
_______-- ---- 1
200
- i i 6
0
0 *
0 6
0 100 150 200
k (vehicles/km)
(b)
120
100
ow
40 600
40 V
20 1.
0
8* 6
0 I
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
q (vehlcleuihour)
(c)
250
250
7000
Figure 2-1: (a) Observation points in (k, u) diagram, (b) Observation points in (k, q)
diagram, (c) Observation points in (q, U) diagram [50].
23
a
qqma
U
Umax
Ue
k jam
(b) Density-Flow (k, q) diagram.
Figure 2-2: Greenshields model.
taking its maximum value umax when k = 0 and declining to u = 0 when k = kjam,
the jam density. Thus, the basic relationship for the Greenshields model is:
(2.2)U = Umax 1 - ).
kjam
The linear relationship between speed u and traffic density k leads to a parabolic
relation for the (k, q) diagram shown in Fig. 2-2(b). Combining Eq. 2.1 and 2.2, we
can write:
q = Umaxk 1 - k )
k3am
(2.3)
In the (k, q) diagram, the value k, for which flow q reaches its maximum qmax is called
critical density, since it marks the start of an unstable flow area where additional
input of vehicles on a road segment decreases traffic flow and eventually leads to
traffic congestion, i.e., q = 0 and k = kjam. By differentiating the right hand side of
Eq. 2.3 and setting the derivative equal to zero, we obtain:
(2.4)k_ - kjam2
Substituting Eq. 2.4 into 2.2, we also find that the value u, associated with kc and
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kjam
(a) Density-Speed (k, u) diagram.
k
q max is equal to "-ar. Replacing k with k = also provides:
qmax = Umax kjam (2.5)
Since the Greenshields model requires specifications of only two parameters ULmax and
kjam, it is especially attractive for practice use. In this thesis, we use the Greenshields
model to estimate and to predict traffic flow in our experiments for the proposed
dynamic pricing mechanism. In a real world deployment of our system, we can obtain
more accurate real-time traffic flow information via sensor networks.
2.2 Traffic Assignment Models
2.2.1 Static Traffic Assignment Models
With the rapid growth of automobiles industry at the beginning of 1 9 th century, road
congestion had soon become a serious problem in modern cities and has captured
strong interest of many researchers. To understand drivers' behavior and traffic pat-
terns that are subject to congestion, in 1952, Wardrop conducted several experiments
to figure out the relation of speed and flow on a given road segment in one direc-
tion [7]. As a result, he derived two sound principles that define the two well-known
notations of traffic equilibria. In particular, according to Wardrop's first principle,
the network is considered stable when the travel times in all used routes are equal and
less than those which would be experienced by a single driver on any unused route.
In other words, given that the travel time on every route on the network are publicly
known, each driver non-cooperatively chooses his best route and has no incentive to
switch to other routes since he can not further reduce his travel time. The traffic flows
that have this property are defined as User Equilibrium (UE) flows. Different from
the first principle, Wardrop's second principle assumes that drivers consistently make
route choice decisions cooperatively with each other to minimize total system travel
time. We can also imagine that there exists a central authority who tell users which
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routes to follow, and they fully comply with these suggestions to maximize the system
performance. Under this behavior, when the average travel time is minimized, the
second principle claims that the network reaches its equilibrium state called Social
Optimal (SO) state.
Over the last five decades, Wardrop's principles have inspired many transportation
specialists to formulate and solve mathematical models to obtain the UE and SO
flows in.urban transportation networks [6,53-59]. Their works are often classified as
static traffic assignment (STA) problem, which is described in [60] as follows. Given
the inputs: i) a graph representation of an urban transportation network, ii) the
associated link performance functions, and iii) an origin-destination matrix that shows
the trip rates between all OD pairs during the period of analysis, the STA problem
is finding the traffic flow on each link on the network. The link travel time can then
be computed by using link performance functions. The STA problem aims to help
transportation planners and road authorities to: i) estimate the distribution of traffic
flows and travel times on all links given a level of demand, ii) identify heavily congested
links, and iii) make appropriate physical changes to the road network such as adding
one or more links. The last goal is extremely important because adding more resources
to the network might deteriorate the network performance, i.e., increase delays and
congestion instead of decreasing them. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is known
as Braess paradox [61] and has been studied extensively in [62,63].
The first mathematical model to solve the above STA problem was proposed
in 1956 by Beckmann et al. [53]. This pioneering work of Beckmann has laid a
foundation for a variety of extended works in the field (see [6, 57, 58] and references
therein). Sheffi [60] shows that Beckmann's User-Equilibrium model can be expressed
as a nonlinear mathematical optimization problem:
min z(x) = ta(w) d
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subject to
k fg = q,,, Vr,s,
k
Xa k a, , 
r s k
fs ;> 0, V k, r, s,
where k is a path that connects origin r and destination s, Xa is the flow on link a,
ta is the travel time on link a, fks is the flow on path k connecting OD pair (r, s), q,,
is the trip rate between r and s. The indicator variable 6"k is equal to 1 if link a is
on path k between OD pair (r, s) and 0 otherwise.
The solution for the above formulation is the link flows x that satisfy the UE
conditions and reflect that all the trip rates qs have been distributed appropriately.
The objective function is the sum of the integrals of the link performance functions.
At the first glance, the objective function looks obscure. In fact, this is a potential
function of a routing game among drivers. We will comment on this potential game
formulation later when we review game theory and mechanism design in Section 2.4.1.
The first two constraints are flow conservation constraints, which guarantee that all
trip rates have to be assigned to the network. The last constraint is nonnegativ-
ity constraint, which is used to ensure that the obtained solution will be physically
meaningful. Beckmann showed that this mathematical programming formulation is
equivalent to the UE assignment problem. He also proved the existence and unique-
ness of the solution. In addition, it is shown that the above formulation is a convex
optimization program since the link travel time function is a monotonically increasing
function.
Beginning in the late-1960s and continuing into the mid-1980s, many researchers
had proposed different approaches to solve Beckmann's UE formulation including
heuristic and convex combination approaches. The two most common heuristic meth-
ods are capacity restraint and incremental assignment, which were originally proposed
by Mosher in 1963 [54] and Martin and Manheim in 1965 [55] respectively. Although
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these techniques are embedded in many early transportation planning computer pack-
ages [64, 65], they were criticized due to the lack of convergence properties [66,67].
The capacity restraint methods are not guaranteed to converge, and incremental as-
signment methods may converge to a nonequilibrium solution. Apparently, they can
not obtain a set of flows that satisfy UE conditions. This unsatisfactory performance
of heuristic approaches has posted a strong need for a novel numerical optimization
method. Fortunately, a novel method called convex combination algorithm proposed
by Frank and Wolfe in 1956 [68] is capable of solving quadratic programming problems
with linear constraints. Not until thirteen years later, in 1969, Bruynooghe discovered
Frank and Wolfe' work and suggested an application of convex combination method to
solve the transportation network equilibrium problem [56]. Basically, in this method,
flows are taken from more congested paths and assigned to less congested paths until
flow changes are small. The method then uses a shortest path algorithm to solve a
linear program subproblem because the algorithm is very efficient even for large net-
works. The convex combination method has been proven through numerous research
to be a simple and efficient method to the minimization of the UE program [69-72].
Although the method converges slowly, it is still popular since other faster methods
require more memory and do not use shortest path subproblem naturally.
Regarding the SO flow pattern, Beckmann's SO formulation is described in [60]
as follows:
min z(x) ZXata(Xa)
a
subject to
Z k fS =qrs V r,s,
k
Xa =>Z fs6ask, Ia
r s k
frs;> 0, V k, r, s.
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The objective function of the SO formulation is more straightforward than in the
UE formulation. It aims to minimize total travel time spent in the network subject
to the same constraints as in the UE equivalent program. However, as pointed out
in [60], the SO formulation does not generally generate an equilibrium flow pattern
since some travelers can be better off by unilaterally switch routes. Hence, the SO
flow pattern is not stable and should not be used to represent the actual behavior of
drivers and equilibrium state. It can be used to observe the best-case scenario when
all drivers cooperately make decisions. The SO formulation is also helpful when we
want to compare different static traffic assignment models [73]. In particular, we can
use a popular measure named the price of anarchy [74], which is the ratio between
the total utility at UE and SO state to see how far the UE performance is from the
best possible use of the network. The SO formulation can be solved by using the first-
order necessary conditions of the associated Lagrangian function. Section 3.4 in [60]
provides the details of the method. We note that the solution to the SO formulation
can also be found by using the convex combination method mentioned above.
Parallel to the development of algorithms to solve Beckmann's formulation, ex-
tensions of Beckmann's model have also been investigated (see [59] and references
therein). These extended models often introduce side constraints to become more
realistic than the traditional traffic assignment models. For example, the constraints
can be used to model the effects of a traffic control policy or to describe the link
capacity restrictions set by a road authority. However, these extended models have
not been fully developed and solved due to associated computational issues.
Despite of all of the hard work to craft and solve existing STA formulations,
the STA models' tractability in real-world deployments is still a major concern since
they have some fundamental issues. First, because the UE flow pattern is rooted in
drivers' selfish behavior, attaining the UE flow pattern does not help in preventing or
alleviating traffic congestion. Therefore, the SO flow pattern, which results in better
network performance, is more preferable for a central authority. However, as some
drivers suffer longer paths than others to allow for the efficiency of the entire system,
and they naturally want to change to other shorter paths, the SO flow pattern is
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unfair and unstable. Second, the STA models assume that OD flows are constant
within the considered period in order to apply steady-state analyses. To keep this
assumption accurate, the period of analysis can only be very small. However, this
requirement is not reasonable since the STA models are only meaningful when their
period of analysis is longer than the typical duration of trips at this time. Therefore,
STA models are not sufficient to describe the dynamics of traffic flows during a very
short specific period of time such as peak hours, when flows are changing rapidly and
unpredictably.
2.2.2 Dynamic Traffic Assignment Models
The limitations of STA models have motivated researchers to develop Dynamic Traffic
Assignment (DTA) models to adequately represent traffic reality and drivers' behav-
ior. Departing from STA to deal with time-varying traffic flows, DTA refers to a wide
range of problems, each depends on different sets of decision variables, system inputs,
assumptions about systems and users, and modeling purposes. According to Peeta
and Ziliaskopoulos [2], approaches to DTA can be classified into two main groups:
analytical approaches (mathematical programming, optimal control, variational in-
equality) and simulation-based approaches.
Analytical approaches:
In 1978, Merchant and Nemhauser (hereafter referred to as the M&N) proposed
the first DTA model, which is a discrete time, nonlinear and nonconvex mathematical
programming problem [9, 10]. The M&N model only considers deterministic, fixed-
demand, one destination, one commodity and SO cases. Basically, there are a link
exit function that aims to propagate traffic and a static link performance function
that computes travel cost based on link volume. The global optimum of the M&N
formulation can be obtained by solving a piecewise linear version of the model with
additional assumptions on the objective function by using a one-pass simplex algo-
rithm. Later, Ho suggested a stepwise linear version of this model and pointed out
that we can also achieve the global optimum by solving a sequence of at most N+1
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linear programs, where N is the number of periods [75]. Following Ho, Carey showed
that the M&N problem can be reformulated as a well-behaved convex nonlinear pro-
gram and solved by standard mathematical programming software [76]. Carey also
extended his models to handle multiple destinations and multiple commodities case.
Unfortunately, the resulting formulation does not satisfy many requirements of gen-
eral networks such as "first in first out" (FIFO) and no "holding back" ("holding
back" is an issue arising when traffic at certain approaches is held back to let other
traffic streams move faster to minimize system total delays, and this creates unfair
or unreasonable SO flow pattern). To address the above unsatisfaction, substantial
research on DTA using mathematical programming with different sets of assumptions
have been conducted [77-79. Nevertheless, attaining both mathematical tractability
and high fidelity of real traffic flows is still an open problem.
Another approach to DTA is known as optimal control formulation, in which the
OD trip rates and link flows are continuous functions of time. The constraints are
similar to those in mathematical programming formulation but are modified to adapt
in a continuous-time setting. The initial link-based UE and SO optimal control for-
mulations for one destination case are suggested by Friesz et al. [80]. Following Friesz,
Wie extended the UE model to capture the elastic time-varying travel demand [81].
Ran and Shimazaki then formulated a link-based SO model for general networks [82].
However, this model overlooked the FIFO issue and can only be applied for a very
small scale network. Subsequently, various optimal control theory-based DTA models
are discussed in the literature [83-85], but they are based on unrealistic assumptions
and lack of additional constraints to manage FIFO and "holding back" issues. Im-
portantly, efficient algorithms for solving these formulations are still questionable.
To circumvent the problems associated with optimal control theory-based models,
another approach called variational inequality (VI) has been researched. VI prob-
lem, as defined by Nagurney in [57], is a general problem formulation that includes a
plethora of mathematical problems such as nonlinear equations, optimization prob-
lems, complementarity problems, and fixed point problems. Therefore, VI formulation
is applicable for traffic assignment problem since it allows for a unified treatment of
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equilibrium problems and optimization problems. Originally, this approach was in-
troduced by Dafermos in 1980 for solving the STA problem [86]. A decade later, a
continuous time VI model for departure time and route choice decision making was
suggested by Friesz et al., but no proof of solution existence or uniqueness as well as
no efficient algorithm were provided [87]. Wie et al. then formulated the problem as
a discretized VI model, in which they replaced exit time functions used in Friesz's
formulation by exit flow functions [88]. They also devised a heuristic algorithm to
solve it approximately. Although the existence of a solution under some certain con-
ditions was proved in this work, the need for an efficient algorithm still remains since
this path-based formulation requires tremendous computational efforts to enumerate
complete paths. To reduce the computational burden of path-based models, several
link-based models were proposed [89-91]. While these VI models are more general and
provide greater analytical flexibility to address multiple DTA problems than other an-
alytical models, it turns out that they expose to more severe computational feasibility
issues. Furthermore, they are still unable to overcome challenges arising in realistic
networks such as FIFO and "holding back". As a result, in recent years, DTA models
have migrated toward new approaches called simulation-based approaches, discussed
hereafter.
Simulation-based approaches:
The goals of simulation-based DTA models are to use a traffic simulator to repli-
cate dynamic traffic phenomena and to search for the optimal traffic flow propaga-
tion. More crucially, researchers aims to use the simulator iteratively to forecast
the future traffic conditions. Thanks to this promisingly descriptive and predictive
power, the transportation literature have witnessed a boom in research on simulation-
based DTA models since the first well-recognized work of Van Aerde and Yagar in
1988 [92,93]. Traffic simulators have different types depending on the choice of gran-
ularity such as macroscopic, microscopic or mesoscopic. At first, several microscopic
models have been developed for small scale networks, and some are actually embedded
in commercial software such as AIMSUN2 [94] and INTEGRATION [92,93]. Later,
mesoscopic models, which are a combination of a microscopic representation of indi-
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vidual vehicles and macroscopic description of interactions among traffic flows, have
been evolved to cope with large-scale networks. Some recognized mesocopic models
are DYNASMART [95,96], and DYNAMIT [97]. Although these models circumvent
some persistent modeling issues in analytical approaches by directly addressing them
through simulation process, it is impossible to derive proofs of existence, uniqueness
and convergence of solutions due to the lack of theoretical formulations. In addition,
the computational cost associated with the use of a simulator is still too high to make
the models applicable in practice. The underlying difficulty lies in selfish behavior
of drivers. As drivers independently and constantly make route choice decisions that
are in their best interest, predicting future traffic flows requires lots of memory and
long computation time. Therefore, recently, there has been a heightened interest
in searching for deployable traffic policies to positively affect drivers' behavior, and
incorporating the policies into models to reliably represent and predict real traffic
maneuvers. The next section reviews congestion pricing as one of these policies and
its application in practice.
2.3 Congestion Pricing
As urban transportation exhibits the phenomenon of diseconomies of scale, the idea
of congestion pricing is based on the underlying economics of transportation systems.
This approach was initiated by Pigou in his famous book The Economics of Welfare
(1920) [98]. Pigou used an example of a congested road to show that travelers were not
using roads efficiently because they did not have to pay for the congestion costs they
imposed on others. A price mechanism that charges suitable fees on different roads
would motivate travelers to use the facilities more efficiently and rebalance traffic
flows. This would reduce aggregate travel time and thus increase social benefits.
Since Pigou's first work, congestion pricing has received remarkable attention in the
scientific literature for decades (refer [99] and references therein). In the following
discussion, we will review the marginal cost pricing theory and practical congestion
pricing schemes.
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2.3.1 Marginal Cost Pricing
Theoretically, research in congestion pricing has relied upon the fundamental eco-
nomic principle of marginal cost (first-best) pricing. The marginal cost pricing prin-
ciple was developed based on demand-supply curves for the standard case of a traffic
flow with homogeneous users moving inside a given network [100-102]. The idea is
that each driver should pay a cost or congestion charge that is equal to the external
congestion costs that he imposes on all other drivers. This marginal cost is the dif-
ference between the cost of road usage to an individual and the social cost of adding
one extra vehicle to the traffic stream. Formally, the marginal cost pricing principle
was summarized in [103] as follows.
Let q be the traffic flow, in terms of the number of vehicular trips per unit of
time, w be the level of service or capacity (this is commonly assumed to be fixed),
and v(q, w) be the average cost per vehicular trip or marginal private cost (MPC)
that a road user spends when operating a vehicle on road facility. Then, the total
opportunity cost of congestion is:
V(q,w) = q x v(q,w). (2.6)
The optimal road price p or marginal social cost (MSC) of an extra vehicular trip can
be derived by taking the first derivative of Eq. 2.6 with respect to q:
_V &v(q, w)
P v(q,w) + q . (2.7)Oq Oq
Eq. 2.7 shows that the optimal road price p has two components: the marginal private
cost, plus the change in the marginal private cost from serving an additional user.
According to the marginal cost pricing principle, the optimal congestion charge T that
each driver should pay is exactly equal to the second component of Eq. 2.7:
T= q . (2.8)
Og
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The concept of marginal cost pricing is intuitively illustrated in Fig. 2-3, which
depicts the curves of the MSC function, given by OV / &q, the MPC function v(q)
(assuming that w is fixed) and a demand function. The optimal congestion charge r
imposing on each driver is equal to the difference between two points: the intersection
of the MSC curve and the demand curve, and the MPC at social optimal flow q,,
level. In other words, T closes the gap between the MPC and the optimal road price
p for facility use, shifts traffic from user equilibrium state q", to qso and creates a net
welfare benefit (patterned area). Given fixed road capacity, an increase of the travel
demand would lead to higher congestion charge and a larger net welfare benefit.
Capacity
MSC bound
'-4C
Demand
Welfare
U benefit
MPC
qSO qu qmaxTraffic flow, q
Figure 2-3: Graphical explanation of marginal cost pricing: the optimal congestion
charge imposing on each driver helps to shift the traffic from the user equilibrium
flow level q,,, to the social optimal flow level qO and yields a net welfare benefit [103].
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2.3.2 Congestion Pricing Schemes
Although the marginal cost pricing theory is appealing, this pricing scheme has not
been implemented in practice due to technological difficulties arising when computing
a payment for every traveler. The first congestion pricing scheme in practice is Area
Licensing Scheme (ALS), which was launched by Singapore in 1975 [104,105]. The
ALS system charged drivers who crossed a cordon line around the central business
district (CBD) during peak hours on week-day mornings about US$1 a day or $20
a month. Although the ALS reduced 75 percent of private vehicle travel and 50
percent of all vehicles entering the CBD, surprisingly the actual travel times per bus
or auto trip to a destination in CBD did not change due to the disruptive effects of
traffic rerouting to the free of charge peripheral roads. The high charges also yielded
under-utilization of the road network and shifted congestion to expressways and non-
restricted time. Thus, in 1995, a paper-based Road Pricing Scheme (RPS), operating
in the same way as the ASL, was introduced on an expressway (East Coast Parkway)
and later extended to other expressways to further alleviate congestion [105]. One
problem associated with both systems was limited temporal and spatial variations
in charges due to the lack of automation. In fact, paper-based schemes required
personnel to operate the system, and this led to high probability of mistakes by
operating officers. In addition, there was always a rush to enter just before or after
the restricted hours that could not be smoothed by a shoulder-peak charge. To handle
this problem, in 1998, the government introduced a new system namely Electronic
Road Pricing (ERP) to replace the current system [105]. Gantries were installed at
all the approach roads to the CBD zone and on the expressways. Different from the
ALS, the ERP scheme charges vehicles each time they pass through a gantry. The fees
are automatically deducted from CashCards, a smart card inserted in the In-vehicle
Units (lUs) of vehicles. The current ERP scheme has different charges according to
vehicle type, time of the day and gantry locations.
Following Singapore, a variety of congestion pricing schemes have been deployed
worldwide such as High Occupancy Toll (HOT) and High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV)
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lane facilities in California and the Twin Cities in the U.S., congestion charge fa-
cilities in London, Stockholm, Valletta and Milan. More examples and details can
be found in [103,104,106]. To increase the effectiveness of congestion management,
several systems vary tolls according to a predetermined schedule. For instance, on
State Route 91 (SR91), the primary link between Orange and Riverside counties
south and east of Los Angeles, as of July 2013, tolls vary between $1.40 in the early
morning hours and $9.55 during peak hours [107]. In Singapore, the ERP rates are
adjusted regularly depending on time of day, day of week (weekday vs weekend) and
season. However, these pre-computed time-varying tolling schemes do not fully pre-
vent congestion, since urban traffic also varies continuously within a day and across
days.
As an attempt to compute flow-dependent tolls in dynamic environments, Joksi-
movic proposed a toll design model that combines road pricing with DTA by using
bi-level mathematical programming [18]. In particular, a bi-level program contains
the upper level, where a road authority decides tolls on links, and the lower level,
where travelers independently respond to the tolls by changing their travel behavior.
More precisely, travelers try to maximize their utilities to reach the UE state for the
announced toll level, while the road authority aims to optimize his objective given
that the traffic flows would be at the UE state. In Joksimovic's model, the classical
DTA model is extended and modified to capture impacts of road pricing on drivers'
decision and serves as the lower level of the problem, while the road pricing model
serves as the upper level of the problem. The complexity of the problem is NP-hard, as
pointed out by the author. The author then suggested a two-stage iterative procedure
for determining the optimal tolls that the road authority should charge on links in
order to reach his objective. However, such iterative solution approach is not scalable
and does not provide insightful understanding of the properties of obtained solutions
for further improvement. For example, one cannot infer the behavior of an individual
traveler if the road authority changes the toll level slightly or the influence of travel-
ers on each other. Therefore, recently, many researchers have adopted game-theoretic
approaches to understand the problem from the microscopic perspective [108-110].
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We are going to overview this approach in the next section.
2.4 Game-theoretic Approaches
2.4.1 Game Theory and Mechanism Design
Game theory is a mathematical way to describe strategic reasoning of rational decision-
makers. Since 1950, game theory has been widely studied in several disciplines such
as economics, political science and biology to understand the competition and cooper-
ation among agents and the role of threats or punishments in long term relations. By
definition, a game must consist of multiple players, each player must make a decision,
and each player has a utility function that depends on his own decision and other
players' decisions [111]. In a game, all players independently maximize their utility
functions. As traffic routing problem involves multiple travelers as rational players,
and each player needs to make his traveling decision to optimize his utility function,
the problem can be seen as a non-cooperative or selfish routing game. Therefore,
several results from game theory can be used to analyze and characterize properties
of the problem.
Although previous works in traffic routing have not directly investigated the prob-
lem from the game-theoretic perspective, some aspects of game theory has been
touched slightly. For example, under game theory terminologies, it turns out that
Wardrop's first principle on the UE traffic flow pattern coincides with Nash equilib-
rium solution concept of a game [111]. For another example, the objective function in
Beckmann's UE formulation discussed in Section 2.2.1 is in fact a potential function
of the routing game, which is a potential game. Potential games are games that admit
a potential function as a function of all players' decisions that gives information about
each player's utility function. In particular, the maximization of a potential function
with respect to a player's decision coincides with the maximization problem of that
player [111]. Similarly, when congestion pricing is introduced for traffic flow man-
agement, the mentioned bi-level programming problem is a single leader rest follower
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Figure 2-4: Mechanism design.
problem and is known as a Stackelberg game [110].
The above induced games are formed naturally by selfish behavior of travelers
and the interaction among travelers and the road authority. We can use results
from the game theory literature to further analyze the existing games. However, it is
well-known that computing Nash equilibria is computationally hard in a general game
[112]. Therefore, a new trend in game theory is to design games with special structure
that are easy to be solved for equilibria. This sub-discipline is called mechanism design
and has been studied intensively by economists to construct market mechanisms and
auction mechanisms [113].
The mechanism design problem is to allocate resources among players in a strategic
setting, assuming that each player acts rationally to maximize his utility. The goal is
to aggregate individual preferences into a desirable outcome or a collective decision.
A mechanism is depicted in Fig. 2-4. Given that there are n players, each player
has a type Oj, which is his private information or preference. Let Oi denote the set
of possible types of player i and E = E1 x ... x 0, denote the set of all possible
types of all players. Each player then reports his type called reported type Oj to the
mechanism. Subsequently, the mechanism aggregates all players' reported types into
a desirable outcome x by applying function f : E -+ X, where X is the set of all
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possible outcomes. Finally, the mechanism allocates resources to players based on
the computed outcome x.
An important feature of the mechanism design problem is that individuals' actual
preferences are not publicly observable. Incentivizing agents to reveal their private
information would significantly simplify the problem to achieve this goal. When being
asked, an agent can lie about his true information. If a mechanism ensures that each
agent's best interest is to truthfully reveal his private information regardless of what
the others do, we say that the mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) or strategy-
proof [21]. We, however, can not force an agent to join a game created by a mechanism
which offers him less expected utility in comparison to not joining the game. Thus,
we call a mechanism is individual rational (IR) if for all agents, it does not incur
any loss to join the resulting game. Constructing a mechanism with both IC and IR
properties is desirable in mechanism design. Besides IC and IR, mechanism designers
also concern about computational complexity when computing an allocation rule for
achieving intended results and a payment rule that motivates the agents [23]. The
key technical difficulties lie in the combinatorial nature of the allocation rule and the
interweaving relationship of allocation rules and payment rules.
The simplest method to obtain agents' private information is to ask them directly.
This type of mechanisms is called direct mechanisms. Indirect mechanisms would
elicit a function of private information from agents. Without loss of generality, we can
focus on incentive-compatible direct mechanisms based on a well-known result named
Revelation Principle. This principle proves that if there exists an equilibrium with
dominant strategies in an indirect mechanism, then we can construct an equivalent
incentive-compatible direct mechanism, in which agents truthfully report their private
information and are allocated services and charged prices accordingly [21,114].
Influenced by the use of mechanism design in auction theory context, several
transportation researchers have came up with different tradable permit schemes, in
which the road space is treated as a common commodity. Teodorovic et al. proposed
an auction-based congestion pricing scheme to reduce traffic congestion in a downtown
area [37]. Under this scheme, all drivers who want to access to a cordoned downtown
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area in a specific time period must participate in an auction and submit bids to a
road authority acting as an auctioneer. The bids vary according to the duration of
drivers' visit to the downtown area. The road authority then can decide whether to
accept or reject particular bids by the drivers. Later, a similar scheme called tradable
bottleneck permits was suggested by Akamatsu [115] and then was extended in [38].
This day-to-day auction mechanism requires a traveler to bid everyday to purchase
from the road authority a bundle of network permits that allow the traveler to use his
preferred path. Although the authors show that truthfully reporting the valuation
of several bundles of permits is a dominant strategy for each user, it is difficult for
users to determine their true valuation. Since each permit is only valid for a link on a
specific time, obtaining sufficient permits for the whole path requires a large number
of transactions, especially when the network is complex. To simplify the system,
Yang et al. investigated an alternative tradable credit scheme in which travel credits
hold by drivers can be used on any link, but each link has different amount of credit
charge [39]. At the beginning, government will distribute free credits to travelers and
then travelers can buy or sell their credits in a free credit trading market without the
government's interference.
While tradable permit schemes are actually deployed in practice under Kyoto
Protocol agreement in order to limit emissions of greenhouse gases [116], they are
not practical to be implemented for real-world road networks due to several reasons.
The schemes require road users to go through a bidding or trading process before
being able to use the paths, while in reality, road users often needs an instantaneous
route choice decision. In addition, the schemes raise concerns about inequity when
the poor is deprived of accessing to the infrastructure, and the rich holds most of
the permits. Furthermore, although the tradable permit scheme approach, in some
aspects, can reduce the computational burden of finding an allocation rule for very
simple networks such as single OD pair networks, it is still not clear how to determine
the allocation rule for heterogeneous travelers in general networks.
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2.4.2 Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Since we are working on large-scale transportation networks, besides the game-theoretic
aspects, it is also important to address computational tractability and scalability. The
study of computational aspects in mechanism design has been investigated recently
in an emerging sub-discipline called algorithmic mechanism design. On the one hand,
researchers in this community address questions on how to bring computational as-
pects into economics and game theory by asking what equilibria notions are reason-
able to assume. On the other hand, they also focus on how to bring game theory
and economics into computer science and algorithmic theory by designing reasonable
algorithms that are resilient to selfish behavior of agents [21].
Computer scientists have used the algorithmic mechanism design approach to
tackle important problems in communication networks including resource allocation,
pricing and multicast cost sharing [24-31]. As the Internet is rapidly growing in scale,
the interaction between administrative domains known as Autonomous Systems and
end-users have become extremely complicated due to different goals and incentives.
In addition, since the network is shared by a large number of users, congestion may
occur when resource demands exceed the capacity (e.g. link bandwidths), leading to
packet delay and loss. Auctions have been suggested multiple times as an efficient
mechanism that incentivizes users to share network resources in an optimal manner.
For example, Lazar et al. devised a mechanism called Progressive Second Price (PSP)
auction for allocating variable-size shares of a resource among a fix set of users [24].
The mechanism was proven to be incentive compatible and efficient in the sense that
it maximizes the social welfare. Later, Maille et al. extended the PSP auction to
deal with stochastic environment where users randomly enter and leave the system
according to Poisson processes [25]. Other works on network resource allocation
based on auction theory can be found in [26-28]. Although these works consider
different possible mechanisms to resolve the incentive issues in Internet routing, the
resulting routing protocols are hard to be implemented using the current network
stack. In particular, the interdomain routing on the Internet is handled by the Border
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Gateway Protocol (BGP), and it would be desirable to have a mechanism that can
utilize this protocol. In [29], the authors propose a mechanism with a distributed
allocation algorithm that is a straightforward extension to BGP and causes only
modest increases in routing table size and convergence time. This mechanism aims
to maximize network efficiency by routing packets along the lowest-cost paths.
2.4.3 Vickrey- Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
To achieve the incentive compatibility property, all of the above mechanisms for com-
munication networks are constructed based on the arguably most important positive
result in mechanism design, i.e., the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism [21,117-119]. The main ideas of the VCG mechanism can be explained in the
following scenario.
We assume that that there are n players and a set of alternatives A that the
mechanism can perform to allocate resources to all players. Each player i has his true
valuation vi(a) for each alternative a C A. In addition, each player has a reported
valuation bi(a) for each alternative a C A that he reveals to the mechanism. If
alternative a* is executed, the utility of player i is equal to the difference between his
true valuation for a* and the cost that he needs to pay to the mechanism as follows:
ui = vi (a*) - pi (a*).
The goal of the mechanism is to determine the alternative a* that maximize social
welfare EZ vi(a). First, based on the reported value bi(a) of each player i for each
alternative a, the VCG mechanism find the alternative a* that maximizes EZ bi(a).
Then, the VCG mechanism charges each player i with price
pi(a*) [maxE b (a)] bj (a*). (2.9)
The first component is obtained by removing player i and recomputing the maximum
reported valuation of all other players that can be achieved with another alterna-
43
tive. The second component is the sum of reported valuation of all players except i
when alternative a* is chosen. Intuitively, the VCG payment rule implies that each
player i needs to pay the externality that he imposes on others when joining the
mechanism. We emphasize that this result coincides with the marginal cost pricing
principle discussed in Section 2.3 under more general settings.
The VCG mechanism has several important properties as follows:
1. Incentive compatibility (IC) property: The mechanism is truthful in the
sense that the best strategy for each player is to reveal his true valuation for
each alternative. Let ui(vi, b-i) denote the utility of player i when he reports
his true valuation vi, and ui(bi, b-i) denote his utility when he reports bi, given
that all other players report bi. Then the IC property shows that ui(vi, b-i) >
ui(bi, b-i) for all bi. To see this property, we denote:
a argmaxa bA ± (i bj(a)I and % = arg maxaEA [vi(a) + Zji bj(a)]
as the alternatives selected by the VCG mechanism when player i reports bi
and vi respectively. We then have:
u (vi, b-i) = vi(2) - pi(a')
= v (a)- * max S b (a) - b(a*)
= vi(a) + b (a)' - max b (a)
acA
= max vi (a) + bj(a)]- max b (a)
aEA acA
> vi(a*) + Zb (a*) - max b (a)
= vi(a*) - max bj(a) - bj(a*)
= vi(a*) - pi (a*) = u (bi, b_ ).
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2. No-positive transfers property: Each player's payment pi is always non-
negative, which means that the mechanism never pays to the players. This
property can be seen clearly in Eq. 2.9.
3. Individual rationality (IR) property: If the valuation vi of each player i is
non-negative, then player i's utility ai is also non-negative for all i. This means
players do not lose anything if they participate in the mechanism. We can see
this property as follows:
ui (vi, b_[) =max vi(a) + Zb (a) - max bj (a)
acA aEA
> max b (a) - max b (a)] 0.
acA aEA
j j4i
In spite of all these useful properties, much work has shown that in complex
mechanism design problems such as combinatorial auctions, the allocation rule in
the VCG mechanism is NP-hard to compute [120-122]. The key technical difficulty is
that VCG mechanism requires an optimal solution to ensure the IC property, and this
makes the mechanism computationally intractable. Many computationally tractable
approximation algorithms or heuristics have been suggested, but they usually leads
to untruthful mechanisms [120]. Resolving computational issues in VCG mechanisms
while keeping the IC property of the mechanisms is still an active research area [121].
While the literature on algorithmic mechanism design for computer network rout-
ing is rich with a variety of research directions, applying algorithmic mechanism design
for traffic routing in urban transportation networks remains unexplored. Although
both types of networks share some similar modeling aspects, they are substantially
different from each other in their inherent characteristics. In particular, in computer
networks, utility functions of users are unknown to the network. Even if the utility
functions are known, there is no central authority that knows all the link capacities
and network topology [40]. In addition, autonomous systems (AS) in the network can
run any routing algorithm that benefits them the most. Therefore, we can hardly sim-
45
ulate the flows for the entire computer networks such as the Internet. In contrast, in
transportation networks, passenger utility functions can be modeled quite accurately
based on regression analysis [41]. In addition, we can monitor real-time traffic flows
via sensor networks [42-45] or community based mobile navigation applications such
as Waze [46]. As a result, current models and results in computer network routing
cannot be used and applied in urban transportation network routing.
In this thesis, we aim to design a mechanism that works specifically for trans-
portation networks. To do this, we need to overcome several computational issues
caused by time-varying travel demands from heterogeneous road users with private
preference information on general networks. In particular, designing an allocation
rule and an associated payment rule with the IC property is challenging due to the
combinatorial nature of the problem. We, however, observe that instead of allocating
paths for a number of passengers at the same time, we can allocate a path for each
new passenger sequentially. Correspondingly, we can introduce a new appropriate
equilibrium notation called sequential social surplus. In addition, travelers' utility
function in transportation networks can be reliably derived based on results in dis-
aggregate travel demand modeling that have been studied over the past four decades
(see Chapter 2 in [104] and references therein). By utilizing these observations, we
can overcome computational issues to design a strategy-proof mechanism in a proper
sense. In particular, allocated paths are computed to match passengers' preference
and to maximize sequential social surplus, and tolls are computed to ensure incentive-
compatibility. Once all passengers are incentivized to commit to allocated paths, the
complexity of predicting future traffic flows and computing paths and tolls for in-
coming passengers will be reduced significantly. In the following discussion, we will
review important shortest path algorithms that are the building blocks of computing
the allocation rule and payment rule in our proposed mechanism.
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2.5 Shortest Path Algorithms
2.5.1 Unconstrained Shortest Path Problems
Given a network represented by graph G = (V, E) with nodes V and directed links
(also called arcs) E and the weights of all directed links are non-negative, the tradi-
tional shortest path problem is to build a shortest path tree from a single source node
ro (also called root or origin) to all other nodes in the network. More specifically, the
shortest path tree is a spanning directed tree of G, rooted at ro, which, for each node
v C V, contains a shortest path from ro to v [123]. All shortest path algorithms have
a labeling process of finding a label for each node that contains the cost from root and
the predecessor node on path from root to that node. To do this, the algorithms need
two data structures: one for finding links out of each node and one for keeping track
of candidate nodes to add to the shortest path tree, which is known as a candidate
list. There are two types of shortest path algorithms including label setting and label
correcting algorithms as described below.
The first efficient shortest path algorithm was proposed by Dijkstra in 1959 [124].
Dijkstra's algorithm is a label setting algorithm since when a link is added to the
shortest path tree, it is kept permanently in the tree. Dijkstra's algorithm first adds
the source node to the candidate list with label indicating zero cost. As the algorithm
progresses, it chooses a node with the lowest label from the candidate list to process.
When a node is taken out of the candidate list to process, the shortest path from
root to the processed node has been found, and other labels in the candidate list are
updated if it is faster to reach these nodes via the processed node. Neighboring nodes
of the processed node are also put into the candidate list if they have not been in
the list before. This procedure continues until all shortest paths have been found.
In Dijkstra's algorithm, each node is taken out of the candidate list to add to the
shortest path tree only once, and the candidate list can be implemented as a minimum
priority queue or a minimum heap.
Dijkstra's algorithm is fastest for dense networks in which the average number of
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links out of each node (or out-degree of each node) is greater than 30. For more sparse
network in which the average out-degree is less than 30, a series of algorithms known
as label correcting algorithms have been developed to reduce the computing time. In
label correcting algorithms, a node taken out of the candidate list can be revisited
later if better paths are found. The improvement of each algorithm depends on how
the candidate list is managed. In particular, in Bellman-Ford algorithm developed
in 1958, a new discovered node is always put on the back of the candidate list, and
the next node is taken from the front of the list [125-127]. In 1974, Page devised a
faster algorithm called D'Esopo-Pape by placing a new node in front of the candidate
list if it has been on the list before, otherwise putting it on the back of the list [128].
Bertsekas, in 1992, proposed an algorithm that puts new node on the front of the
candidate list if its label is smaller than current front node, otherwise puts it on the
back of the list [129]. In the same year, Hao and Kocur suggested a faster algorithm
that puts a new node on the front of the list if it has been on the list before. Otherwise,
the new node is put on the back of the list if its label is greater than the front node
label and on the front of the list if its label is smaller [130].
Theoretically, in the worst case scenario, label setting algorithms are faster than
label correcting algorithms. Label setting algorithms run in 0(a2 ) time in simple
versions and in 0(a lg n) time with a heap, where a is the number of links and n is
the number of nodes. For label correcting algorithms, the worst-case time complexity
is O(2a) (except that Bellman-Ford algorithm runs in O(na) time [125]). In practice,
however, label correcting algorithms, which run averagely in 0(a) time, usually out-
perform label setting algorithms, which run averagely in 0(a lg n) time with a heap.
This is because label correctors with an appropriate candidate list data structure in
fact make very few corrections and run fast.
2.5.2 Constrained Shortest Path Problems
The basic problem of finding a shortest path between two specific nodes in a general
network, as discussed above, can be solved in polynomial time by many efficient
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labeling algorithms. Viewed from the mathematical programming perspective, the
traditional shortest path problem can be modeled as an integer programming problem.
Since this problem possesses the unimodularity property in this case, applying linear
programming relaxation can solve the problem in polynomial time. In our mechanism,
however, we not only want to compute a shortest path for each passenger, but we also
want to make sure that the path matches with the passenger's personal preference. To
do this, we need to introduce an additional constraint to our shortest path algorithm.
In fact, the constrained shortest path problems have been addressed by a number of
researchers in the literature and can be classified into three main problems as discussed
in [131]. The first problem is the resource constrained shortest path problem, which
is the problem of a traveler with a budget of various resources who needs to find the
quickest way to reach his destination without overspending his budget. The second
is the vertex constrained shortest path problem, which is the problem of finding the
shortest path that pass through a set of specified nodes (also called vertices). The
last is the time constrained shortest path problem where the are lengths are time-
dependent and/or time windows exist for the nodes.
As our objective is to assign each passenger a path that matches with his travel
time constraint, the induced shortest path problem in our mechanism is a time
windows constrained shortest path problem. It has been showed that the shortest
path problem with time windows constraints and possible negative edge costs is NP-
hard [132, 133]. However, by leveraging the properties of transportation networks
and the novel design of our mechanism, under some mild assumptions, we can apply
the label-correcting algorithm to solve our fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP)
problem in polynomial time. We will describe this process in detail in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
Problem Formulation
This chapter develops a formal problem formulation for our game-theoretic approach
to the optimal traffic routing problem. Section 3.1 provides preliminary notations and
definitions used in the rest of the thesis. Following this, we present our assumptions
in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 formulates a model for a general network with dynamic
traffic flows of heterogeneous travelers. We present our User-Centric Dynamic Pricing
(UCDP) Mechanism in detail in Section 3.4.
3.1 Preliminary Notations and Definitions
3.1.1 Graph
A graph G = (V, E) consists of a finite set V of nodes (or vertices) and a finite set E
of links (or edges, or arcs, or branches), which connect pairs of distinct nodes [134]. A
link that connects node x E V and y E V is denoted as (x, y). An origin-destination
(OD) pair is denoted as OD(r, s). When it is clear in a context, we use (r, s) instead
of OD(r, s) to refer to an OD pair.
A graph is called directed (or oriented) graph if every link in the graph has a
specified orientation (or direction). In contrast, if no link has a specifiec orientation,
the graph is undirected (or nonoriented). A directed link (x, y) has a direction from
x to y and is usually drawn with an arrowhead that indicates its direction. Examples
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Figure 3-1: Examples of graphs.
of undirected and directed graphs are illustrated in Fig. 3.1.1.
A link is incident on the two nodes that it connects. Any two nodes connected by a
link are called adjacent nodes. Similarly, two links are adjacent if they are connected
by a node. For undirected graphs, the degree of a node is the number of links incident
on it. For directed graphs, the indegree of a node is the number or links going to that
node. The outdegree of a node in this case is the number of links going out from that
node.
A path in a graph consists of a sequence of adjacent links that connect a se-
quence of adjacent nodes. A path begins at a node and ends at another node.
In a directed graph, paths are also directed. A path can be represented as se-
quences of adjacent nodes such as P = {a, b, c, ... , i, j, k} or of adjacent links such
as P {(a, b), (b, c), ..., (i, a), (j, k)}. If the starting node and ending node of a path
coincide, the path is called a cycle (or circuit). A path is simple if each link appears
only once in the sequence of links, and is elementary if each node is visited only once.
In this thesis, we only consider simple and elementary paths.
3.1.2 Poisson Process
Suppose that there is a sequence of demand arrivals (or events) such that: (i) suc-
cessive demand inter-arrival (or inter-event) times are mutually independent, and
(ii) demand inter-arrival times are all described by the same exponential probability
density function (PDF), then the number of arrivals constitutes a Poisson process.
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Poisson arrivals
0 Time t
Figure 3-2: Illustration of Poisson arrivals in time.
Fig. 3.1.2 illustrates Poisson arrivals in time. The exponential PDF that represents
demand inter-arrival times of a Poisson process is:
f (t = Ae-, 
t > 0
0, t < 0
where A is arrival rate measured by the average number of arrivals per unit of time,
and is also referred to as the intensity of the arrivals of Poisson events. Let N(t)
denote the above Poisson process. Then the probability that n events occuring in the
time interval [0, t] is:
P(N(t) n) (At) ._t
n!
The mean and variance of N(t) are both At.
The Poisson process plays a central role in transportation modeling, as it can be
used to model approximately the occurrence of random events such as the arrival
of uncoordinated demands at a transportation facility, or the passage of cars by an
observation point on a highway with free-flowing traffic.
3.1.3 Mechanism
Our mechanism has the following components and notations:
* A set H = {Hn}_ 1 of all heterogeneous passengers where Hn denotes a class
of homogeneous passengers who have the same value of time 5d. If passenger i
belongs to class Hn, we know that his value of time is ai = dn.
* A set ( that represents all possible types (i.e., preferences) of all passengers.
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Each passenger i is required to report his type to the mechanism. Let 0, C E)
denote passenger i's true type and 0' C 8 denote his reported type.
" An allocation rule 7T : E x X -+ P, where P is the set of all paths that can
be allocated to the set of passengers H, and X is the set of all network states.
In particular, a state x = (k, q) E X is the state of the network at any time
instant, where k is density, measured by number of vehicles per kilometer and
q is the number of travelers on all links E of the network. The allocation rule
computes a path p for a new passenger i based on his reported type O and the
current network state x E X.
" A payment rule w : P x X -+ R. The payment rule determines the toll that
passenger i must pay to use the recommended path p E P.
3.2 Assumptions
We use the below assumptions in our UCDP mechanism.
1. Each vehicle has only one passenger.
2. Passengers are rational and risk-neutral, i.e., they always choose paths that
maximize their utilities.
3. Passengers naturally want to join the mechanism. This assumption is called
individual rationality (IR) in game theory terminology. We will discuss IR in
Section 7.2.
4. Each passenger i's value of time a, can be derived from several demographic
data such as tax and income.
5. If there exists a path p C P between an OD pair (r, s), then we assume that
there also exists public transportation such as train or light rail between nodes
r and s with infinite capacity.
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6. Travel times on all roads in the network are positive and uniformly bounded
away from zero.
3.3 Dynamic Network Model
We consider a general traffic network represented by a graph G = (V, E) with nodes
V and directed links E. We assume that there are L demand traffic flows in the
network, denoted by {d1 }[;_1. Each demand flow d, can be represented as a Poisson
process with rate A, > 0 arriving at nodes R, where R C V. Each passenger from
these L demand flows has a request to travel from an origin r c V to a destination
s E V. Between each OD pair (r, s), there exists path p e P", where Ps is the set
of all feasible paths between r and s. We define P as the set of all Prs.
We recall that x = (k, q) E X represents the state of the network at any time
instant. In particular, we have k = (ke)eCE and q = (qe)ecE in which ke and q, denote
the density and the number of travelers on a particular link e E E at that time instant.
Each link e E E has a jam density Kje at which the traffic on the link is congested
with zero traffic flow. Based on the Greenshields model described at the beginning
of Chapter 2, Kc, = 1Kje denotes a critical density at which additional input of
vehicles on the link decreases traffic flow and eventually leads to traffic congestion.
The set of all feasible density on link e E E is Ke. We define K= HeE Ke so
that k E K. Similarly, the set of all feasible number of people on link e is Qe, and
q E Q = HecE Qe. We note that x is time-varying.
At any time instant t, assuming that the network state is x, we would like to
simulate the network state - c X after a path p c P is assigned to a new traveler
given that all current travelers in the network are following their assigned paths.
Ideally, we would like to predict X dynamically at any time instant in the future after
the path p is assigned to the new passenger. However, to simplify the notations in
the following discussion, we assume that from that time instant t, the state x of the
network will not change until the new passenger completes his trip. We can simulate
x by simply adding the new traveler on each link e E p C E as if he were traveling on
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Figure 3-3: User-Centric Dynamic Pricing mechanism.
e at time t. Thereafter, given density on link e, the space-average speed of passengers
traveling on the link can be computed by using the Greenshields model described in
Chapter 2. In particular, - = g(x,p) where g : X x P -- X. We will return to
dynamic and real-time prediction in Chapter 5.
The travel time on each link e, denoted by Tre(ke), is a strictly increasing and
convex function of density ke, where k, is extracted from X' = (k, ') =(x, p) and is
the experienced density of the driver. For a new driver who follows a path p E 7P, his
experienced travel time along this path would be:
T(X, p) Te (ke). (3.1)
eEp
3.4 User-Centric Dynamic Pricing Mechanism
We now discuss the user-centric dynamic pricing (UCDP) mechanism in detail. We
remind that H = {H,}N 1 is the set of all heterogeneous passengers where H, denotes
a class of homogeneous passengers who have the same value of time dn. If passenger i
belongs to class Hn, we know that his value of time is ai = dn. The UCDP mechanism
is illustrated in Fig. 3-3 and works as follows. At time t, a passenger i E Hn who
is the latest incoming passenger from L demand flows wants to travel from r E V
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to s E V. Passenger i will report his maximum accepted travel time 0i > Ors, to a
central system. In game-theory terminology, we define 0, as the type of passenger i.
The lower bound 0rs is the minimum time to travel from r to s and is announced
publicly by the road authority. The value of 0,1 is computed in Chapter 5. If there
is currently no path to travel from r to s due to congestion, we define 0rs = +oo,
and the passenger is advised to use public transportation. Otherwise, our mechanism
then computes a suitable path p for this passenger and a toll wi(x, p) that he has to
pay to complete his trip. The utility function of passenger i for such an assignment
is determined as follows:
ui(X, p, Oi) = OQ (Oi - r(x, p)) - Wi(X, p), (3.2)
where T(x, p) is the travel time that passenger i spends when traveling along path p
from r to s and can be computed by Eq. 3.1. We assume that passenger i is risk-
neutral and seeks to maximize his utility ui(X, p, 02) of the trip. Clearly, the first
term in Eq. 3.2 can be considered as passenger i's benefit of making the trip, and the
second term is his cost. Thus, we denote vj(X, P, 0) = aQ (Oi - T(x, p)) as passenger
i's benefit.
The road authority, on the other hand, tries to maximize the social surplus of all
current travelers in the road network. When a path p is assigned to passenger i, the
road authority's utility function is defined as follows:
V (X, P) =~ -- T'e (Eke)qe, (3.3)
ecE
where a"' is the authority's value of time for passenger i on link e, which depends
on this passenger's class, and ke, extracted from X- g(x,p), is the new density on
link e when passenger i travels along path p. In particular, if e 0 p, we have k, = k,
and if e E p, ke is the induced density due to q, + 1 travelers on link e. Equation 3.3
implies that the road authority is better off if the total travel time of current travelers
is smaller.
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As we are handling dynamic traffic network in which demands arrive as Poisson
processes, the ordinary social optimal concept is not suitable. Thus, we propose
sequential social surplus as an alternative measurement of total society's benefit.
More precisely, we define sequential social surplus as follows:
Definition 1 (Sequential Social Surplus) Sequential social surplus is the sequence
of the sum of road authority utility V(x, p) and a new traveler's benefit vi(xp, O) over
time.
Our goal is to assign each passenger i a path p that satisfies his travel time
constraint 0 while maximizing sequential social surplus when passenger i joins the
network. In addition, we want to ensure that the density on each link e E E does not
exceed its critical density KCe for all times t, i.e., the network is always congestion-
free. The exceeding demand is rerouted to public transportation. While we assume
that each passenger will follow the assigned path, there is a concern that a passenger
i could increase his utility ui(xp, O) if he lies about his true tolerated travel time
Oi. Such manipulation would negatively affect the overall network efficiency. To
avoid this situation, our approach, described in Chapters 4 and 5, computes a path
allocation rule and a payment rule that are incentive compatible (or strategy-proof),
which means passengers have no incentive to lie about their preference.
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Chapter 4
Approach
This chapter presents our approach to design an allocation rule and a payment rule,
which are two important components in our mechanism. Section 4.1 describes the
allocation rule, which assigns a path that satisfies each user's time preference while
maximizing sequential social surplus and ensuring that the network is not congested at
any time instant. The allocation rule is formulated as a fairness constrained shortest
path (FCSP) problem. The payment rule, which is described in Section 4.2, calculates
a toll that each passenger pays to use his assigned path based on the marginal cost
principle. Section 4.2 also presents important theorems, in which we prove that the
mechanism has incentive compatibility and no-positive transfer properties under the
above allocation rule and payment rule.
4.1 Allocation Rule
We recall that our first objective is to achieve a path allocation rule that matches
with each user's preference while maximizing sequential social surplus and avoiding
congestion. More precisely, given that at time t, a passenger i reports his type 04, we
aim to solve the following optimization problem for all 0':
max V(x, p) + vi(xp, 0)
pE Prs
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subject to
T(X, p) < 0', (4.1)
k, < Kce, Ve E E. (4.2)
The objective function is to maximize sequential social surplus, which is the sum of
road authority utility V(x,p) and passenger i's benefit vi(x,p, 0). The preference
constraint in Eq. 4.1 expresses an important requirement that the experienced travel
time of passenger i along his assigned path does not exceed his reported maximum
tolerated travel time. To prevent congestion, the link density constraint in Eq. 4.2
dictates that the density of link e when passenger i reaches that link must be lower
than its critical density.
The objective function can be rewritten as follows:
V(x, p) + Vi(X, p, 0$)
-a T'Te (ke)qe + ai (0' - T (X, p))
ecE
~[ S a6T(ke)±+S1:cT.e]e~0 - GiT(X p)
eeE\p eEp
- 5 a"T(k)q + ce 0$ - a 'Te (ke qe - ai Te(ke)
eEE\p eep eCp
=- l asTe(ke)qe + ai01 -ETe(ke)(a"ee+ )
ecE\p eep
E Te(kqe + i6 - T, ee - Ie(ke)] oze + Te(ke)i}
ecE eCP
where q, is the number of travelers in each link right before passenger i starts his trip.
Since we know the network state x and passenger i's reported type as well as
his value of time, the terms ZeEE 9'Te(ke)qe and ai0 are constant. Therefore, our
problem becomes a fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP) with bounded travel
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time:
miii >3 {n[Te(Ee) - Te (ke)] 0'qe + Te(ke)Ci}
eEp ee C k )
subject to
T(X, p) < 0,
ke Kce, Ve c E.
The equivalent arc-based formulation is as follows:
min Ze [Te (ke) - Te(ke) ]ac qe +e, (ke )ai}
eEE
Subject to
E z 1, Z-z
eCr+ eEs-
E - ze = 0,
eCv+ eCv-
Ze [Te(ke) < ,
ecE
ke < Kce, Ve E E,
Ze C {0, 1}, Ve C E.
-1,
Vv E V\{r, s},
The objective function in Eq. 4.6 is to minimize the sum of the increment in total
generalized travel time of current passengers on the roads and the generalized travel
time of the new passenger. Here ze is a binary variable, i.e., it is 1 if link e is on
path p assigned for passenger i, and zero otherwise. The coefficients of ze in the
objective function are called edge costs. The first two constraints in Eq. 4.7 are the
condition that passenger i needs to make a trip from r to s, where r+ is the set of
links going out from origin r and s- is the set of links coming in destination s. Eq. 4.8
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(4.3)
(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11)
is a node balance constraint equation, where v+ represents the set of links coming in
node v c V\{r, s} and v- represents the set of links going out from v. The constraint
in Eq. 4.9 ensures that the travel time of passenger i along his assigned path should
not exceed his stated maximum accepted travel time. The coefficients of z, in this
constraint are called edge weights. The constraint in Eq. 4.10 restricts on link density
to guarantee that congestion will not happen. We note that, to further utilize the
roads, the upper bound KCe in Eq. 4.10 can be set to a higher value without changing
the two algorithms presented in Chapter 5. If the preference constraint in Eq. 4.9
and the link density constraint in Eq. 4.10 are omitted, an optimal solution to this
formulation would coincide with the social optimum in traditional traffic assignment
at this time instant.
In addition, it is worth noting that our objective function also demonstrates how
the value of time of passenger i can affect his assigned path. As the ratio of Oc to aoqe
becomes extremely large, i.e., passenger i needs to reach the destination urgently, the
road authority can deliberately neglect his value of time and can only consider to
minimize travel time on each link for this passenger. Hence, the formulation has
significant meaning in real-world routing when we need to provide a police car or an
ambulance with the fastest path to reach the accident site. Therefore, the combination
of the preference constraint and the role of passenger's value of time in the objective
function successfully model fairness requirement for individuals. To the best of our
knowledge, the proposed model is the first in the literature that considers all of the
above aspects.
Regarding computational complexity of the problem, it is well known that the
general shortest path problems with additional constraints and possible negative edge
costs are NP-hard [133]. However, by leveraging the properties of transportation
networks and the novel design of our mechanism, we can naturally handle the problem
by assuming that travel times on all roads in the network are positive and uniformly
bounded away from zero. Under these mild assumptions, our FCSP problem can
be solved in polynomial time by using the label-correcting algorithm [132,135]. The
implementation of label-correcting algorithm will be explained in detail in Chapter 5.
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4.2 Payment Rule
We now discuss how to design the payment rule such that the proposed mechanism
satisfies incentive compatibility. Given that we have solved the FCSP problem in
Eq. 4.3-4.5, with 0', we obtain an optimal solution p*(Q'), which is the path that we
will allocate to passenger i. With this optimal path, we can calculate the payment
that passenger i pays for using the path based on the marginal cost principle:
wi(x, p*(()) V(x, 0) - V(x, p* (')) (4.12)
=>3 e (ke) -Te(ke) jeq
eCP *(0$)
The first term on the right side of Eq. 4.12 is the maximum value of the authority's
utility when passenger i is not included, and the second term is the authority's utility
when passenger i travels along path p*(0'). We note that tolls for different classes of
passengers are different, depending on the authority's value of time 0e" for a particular
class. This payment rule would favor low-income groups and thus provides fairness
among individuals as discussed by [15]. Under this price, the utility of passenger i,
ui(x, p*(0'), 0i), in Eq. 3.2 becomes:
ai (Oi - T(X, p*(0')) - V(x, 0) + V(x, p* (0)). (4.13)
The pricing mechanism we propose looks similar to the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism that is incentive compatible (see Section 2.4.3). Neverthe-
less, our mechanism is considerably different from VCG mechanism because at each
"game", we only consider a single player, i.e., a passenger, who indirectly plays with
all current passengers in the network before actually joining the network. Moreover,
we have additional preference and capacity constraints in our allocation rule problem,
while VCG mechanism does not have. Therefore, it is necessary to prove that our
mechanism still maintains the strategy-proof property in spite of the modifications
as follows.
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Theorem 1 (Incentive compatibility property) Given the allocation rule determined
by the FCSP problem and the marginal cost payment rule as in Eq. 4.12, reporting
' = O0 is a weakly dominant strategy of passenger i, Vi C H.
Proof: Assume that truth telling is not a weakly dominant strategy for some i, i.e.
there exists some 0, and 0 such that
u (x, p*(0'), 0i) > u (x, p*(0i), 0i), (4.14)
r(X, p*(0')) < Oi, (4.15)
and the network is congestion-free under both reports 0, and 0'. Equation 4.15 means
that p*(0') is a feasible solution to the optimization problem:
max V(x, p) + vi(x, p, 02)
pG prs
subject to
T(X, p) < 02,
ke(e) < KCe, Ve E E.
We have p*(Qj) as the optimal solution to the above problem due to the allocation
rule. Thus:
V(x, p*(0 )) + vi(x, p* (0), 02) < V(x, p*(0i)) + vi(x, p*(0i), 02). (4.16)
On the other hand, substituting Eq. 4.13 into Eq. 4.14, this yields
i (Oi - T(X, p*(0')) - V(x, 0) + V(x, p*(())
> oei (0 - T(X, p*(0i)) - V(x, 0) + V(x, p*(0))
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<- V(X, p* (0')) + vi (X, p* (0'), Oi)
> V (X, p* (OM) + vi (X, p* (0i), Oi).-
Comparing the above inequality with Eq. 4.16, we reach a contradiction.
Similar to the VCG mechanism, our UCDP mechanism also has the no-positive
transfers property as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (No-positive transfer property) Given the allocation rule determined
by the FCSP problem and the marginal cost payment rule as in Eq. 4. 12, passenger
i's payment wi is always non-negative, Vi G H. This means the mechanism never
pays a positive payment to passengers.
Proof: By definition in Eq. 4.12, the payment that passenger i pays for using a path
assigned to him is
WiTX, p*(Oi)) = [Tee) - Te(ke)I aoqe.
Cp (Oil)
According to the density-speed relationship in the Greenshields model described in
Section 2.1, we can derive the travel time on link e when passenger i join that link
Te(ke) as follows:
Te (ke) vna(- _
where 4e is the physical length of link e. A more detailed description of this equation
is included in Section 5.1 in the next chapter. Given that the link length 4,, the
maximum speed vemax and the jam density Kie are constant, it is clear that the travel
time Te (ke) is a monotonically increasing function with respect to the link density ke.
As ke > ke, Te(ke) > Te(ke). In addition, the road authority's value of time z"'' and
the flow on link e q, are always non-negative. Therefore, wi(x, p*(0')) > 0.
65
66
Chapter 5
UCDP Computation
In this chapter, we describe in detail how we allocate paths and compute tolls dynam-
ically. Section 5.1 shows how network states are simulated by applying the Green-
shields model. Section 5.2 provides an algorithm to compute minimum travel times
announced by a road authority by using Dijkstra's algorithm. Following this, an al-
gorithm for computing dynamic path allocation and dynamic tolls are presented in
Section 5.3.
5.1 Traffic Simulation
Assuming that travelers in the networks are following assigned paths, we use the
Greenshields model presented in Section 2.1 to simulate a network state at any time
instant. The density ke on each link e can be computed by counting the number of
passengers on that link. Given maximum speed v;"' and jam density Kie on each
link e E E, the space-average speed ve and travel time T (k,) on each link e at each
time instant are computed as:
e = Vmax(1 )-
and
T(ke) ee,
67
where Le is the physical length of link e. The traffic flow and the maximum traffic
flow on each link e at each tine instant are
fe =ek,
and
1
F" ax - max Kje,
4
respectively.
The above computation process can also be used to predict future network states as
follows. From the current network state x, as passengers in the network are following
their assigned paths, we can simulate to obtain their positions after some duration t.
Hence, we can estimate the number of passengers on all links in the future. We now
can apply the Greenshields model as above to compute the new network state.
Therefore, we assume that there exists a procedure Greenshields(x, t) that pre-
dicts the future network state from the current network x after a period of time t. We
note that the more accurate prediction of X= g(x, p) in Chapters 3-4 can be done by
calling the procedure Greenshields before accessing an edge state (see Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2). The computed states are real-time and dynamic.
5.2 Minimum Travel Time Computation
We compute minimum travel times using Dijkstra's algorithm on the graph with
time-varying edge costs as shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm takes the current
network state x and the OD pair (r, s) as input and returns the minimum time to
travel from r to s.
The algorithm is implemented using a minimum priority queue to store candidate
vertices. Each vertex has a label (T, pre) where T is the time to reach that vertex
from the origin r, and pre denotes the previous vertex on the shortest path from r
to that vertex. When a vertex is taken out of the candidate list, we call the pro-
cedure Greenshields (Line 11) to update a new network state X after taking the
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shortest path from the origin r to that vertex. The predicted edge cost T- (Line 12)
for link e E E is Te(ke) where ke is computed at the time the passenger reach link
e from the new network state X. This computation is performed in the procedure
ComputeEdgeTravelTimes. In addition, in this algorithm, a link with density greater
than the upper bound in Eq. 4.10 is considered to be unavailable (see Line 14). We
update vertex labels in Lines 15-18 if it is better to reach a vertex via the currently
processed candidate vertex. We assume that simulation for obtaining predicted net-
work states can be performed in constant time. Under this assumption, the running
time of Algorithm 1 is E ln V1.
5.3 Dynamic Allocation and Pricing Algorithm
Algorithm 2 shows how assigned paths and tolls are computed dynamically from an
origin node r E V to a destination node s E V. The algorithm takes a reported
maximum travel time 0' from a passenger as well as his value of time a as inputs.
The algorithm also takes the road authority's value of time aO for this passenger on
all links as an input. We use a label-correcting algorithm to find all Pareto-optimal
paths. The details of the basic version of this label-correcting algorithm can be found
in [132, 135].
Essentially, at each vertex, we maintain a set of labels (C, T, pre), each of them
consisting of a cost component C, a travel time component T, and a pointer pre. In
particular, at vertex v E V, the cost component of a label is the cost-of-arriving from
r to v as defined in the FCSP problem (see Chapter 4) by following the path induced
by the label. Similarly, the travel time component is the total travel time from r to
v. The pointer component pre has the form (i, k) where i the previous vertex in the
induced path, and k is the label index of the previous vertex i. At a vertex i, b(i)
denotes the number of labels has been constructed and maintained by the algorithm.
The algorithm uses a minimum priority queue Q (Line 2), which is sorted by the
cost component, to store all labels. In the main loop of the algorithm, we first extract
a label (C"', T", pre7) with the minimum cost component to process (Line 7). Here,
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we have i is the processed vertex, and m is the index of the label at this vertex. Similar
to Algorithm 1, we estimate the future network state 2 (see Line 8) if the passenger
travels the path induced by the processed label to reach the processed vertex. At
Line 9, we compute the edge costs, denoted as ', and the edge travel times, denoted
as 7, from the FCSP problem in the procedure ComputeEdgeCostTravelTimeFCSP as
follows:
Te =Te(ke), ande= - e(ke) ] qe+Tea.
We then consider all neighbor vertices j of the processed vertex i such that edge
(i, j) is not congested, and time to reach vertex j does not exceed 0' from Line 11 to
Line 23. In Lines 13-15, we check if there exists a label at vertex j that outperforms
the path to reach j via i. Such label (Cjn, Tj, pren) exists if
C7K + , > C and Ti" +7, ;> Tj.
When no such label exists, we construct a new label for the vertex j in Lines 17-18. If
j is not the destination vertex s, we put the new label into the priority queue Q (see
Lines 19-20). To expediting the running time of the algorithm, we remove from the
queue those labels at vertex j that are dominated by the new label in Lines 21-23.
Finally, the path with smallest cost from r to s and the associated toll is com-
puted at Lines 24-25. When algorithm finishes processing the entire queue Q, at
the destination vertex s, we obtain all Pareto-optimal paths from r to s that satisfy
the passenger's preference. We can return a list of paths and corresponding tolls for
users to choose from. Nevertheless, based on our model, a rational user would choose
the path with smallest cost C, as currently returned in Algorithm 2 since this path
maximizes the user's utility. The procedure GetBestPath returns the best path p* by
tracing previous pointers backwards from s to r. With the return path p*, the proce-
dure MarginalPricing computes the associated toll as in Eq. 4.12. The complexity
of this algorithm is O('2 1V 2 ) where 0' is the reported maximum tolerated time and
IVI is the number of nodes [132,135].
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Algorithm 1: Dijkstra(G = (V, E), x,r, s)
// Initialization
1 (T,,prer) <- (0,0) ;
// Q: minimum priority queue sorted by T
2 Q - {(T, prer)}
3 InQ, +-- 1 ;
4 for i E V\{r} do
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
(Ti, prej) <- (00, 0);
InQj +- 0;
// Computing shortest path
while Q # 0 do
(T, prec) <- Pop(Q)
// If destination s is found
if i == s then
L break;
// T : shortest time to reach i from r
// Estimate network state after reaching i
x <- Greenshields(x, Ti);
// Compute time-varying edge travel times
<- ComputeEdgeTravelTimes();
// Update labels
for j E Neighbor(G, i) do
if ki, < Kc(i,) /\ T + -,j < T then
(T, prej) +-- (T + -Ti,, i);
if InQj == 0 then
Q <- Q U {(T7,pre3)};
InQj <- 1;
19 return T,
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Algorithm 2: UCDP(G = (V, E), x, r, s, 0', a, ozo)
// Initialization
1 (CJ, T, pre') <- (0, 0, 0);
// Q: minimum priority queue
2 Q <- {(Cr, T,, pre')} ;
// b(i): number of constructed
3 for i E V\{r} do
4 Lb(i) <- 0;
5 b(r) <- 1 ;
sorted by C'
labels at vertex i
// Computing assigned path
while Q $ 0 do
(C7n, T" pre") &- Pop(Q)
// Tim: time to reach i from r with mth path
// Estimate network state after reaching i using this path
x <- Greenshields(x, T);
// Compute time-varying edge costs and travel times for FCSP
(', F) <- ComputeEdgeCostTravelTimeFCSP();
for j E Neighbor(G, i) do
if Tm + i,j < 0' A ki,j < Kc(i,j) then
flag - 1;
for n =1 - b(j) do
if C7" + -,j > Cn A Tl" + 7-,,> T then
L flag +- 0 ;
if flag == 1 then
b(j) - b(j) + 1
ifj s then
j <T pre))}
for (C7, T, pre") E Q do
if C7> A T > Tb(j) then
Q <- Q\{(C,Tn, pren)};
24 p* <- GetBestPath(C, A, pre,);
// Computing toll
25 w <- MarginalPricing(x, p*);
26 return (p* w)
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Chapter 6
Experiments
This chapter demonstrates the performance of the proposed mechanism through two
simulated routing experiments. Section 6.1 presents the first experiment, in which
we simulate the UCDP mechanism on a parallel-link network with one OD pair.
We then compare the performance of the UCDP mechanism with user-equilibrium
and social-optimal performance. In the second experiment described in Section 6.2,
we consider a general network with multiple OD pairs including a bottle neck. We
demonstrate how the road authority uses the UCDP mechanism to manage traffic
flows when disruption occurs at the bottle neck.
6.1 Parallel-link Network
In the first experiment, we tested the UCDP mechanism on a parallel-link network
with one OD pair, in which links (0,3) and (3,4) are longer than the other links, as
shown in Fig. 6-1. The specifications for this network including physical length, max-
imum speed, critical density, and maximum flow for all links are shown in Table 6.1.
The total maximum traffic flow (or capacity) on the three routes from node 0 to node
4 is 1187.5 vehicles per hour (v/h). Passengers can also use public transportation
to reach the destination in one hour. The value of times for all passengers are 10
USD/h, and the value of time of the authority, a", is 100 USD/h for all links. At
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Figure 6-1: Parallel-link network.
Table 6.1: Network specifications for Fig. 6-1. Capacity 1187.5 v/h
Link L(km) v"'a(km/h) Kc(veh./km) F"max(veh./h)
01, 14 2.5 60.0 15.0 450.0
02, 24 3.5 70.0 12.5 437.5
03, 34 10.0 120.0 5.0 300.0
first, the flow rate A, of the traffic demand d, is set at 970 vehicles per hour (v/h),
which is lower than the total capacity of the network. We then increase the demand
to 1500 v/h to observe the network performance when the demand exceeds the ca-
pacity. In these cases, we compare the performance of the UCDP mechanism with
user-equilibrium (UE) and social-optimal (SO) performance. Since we are dealing
with dynamic demand flows, we can not compute a priori UE and SO performance
as usually done in static traffic assignment. Therefore, UE and SO performance in
Figs. 6.1, 6-3 and 6-5 is computed sequentially for every new arriving passenger.
When the demand is 970 v/h, as shown in Fig. 6.1, under the UE setting with
no toll, the densities, link travel times, and flows and passengers' travel time for all
links quickly reach their critical values after about 2.2 hours. This is because all
passengers act selfishly to choose paths with minimum travel time at the time they
arrive at the origin. Therefore, the road reaches the congestion condition rapidly and
28% of passengers need to use public transportation to avoid this situation.
In contrast, at the same level of demand, the UCDP mechanism is able to maintain
congestion-free traffic flows on all links. As we can see in Fig. 6-2(e), the densities on
three links are always smaller than the corresponding critical densities, which means
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congestion does not happen on these links. This observation is the direct consequence
of the constraints considered in the FCSP in Chapter 4. Therefore, the link travel
times in Fig. 6-2(f) are stabilized, and the traffic flows in Fig. 6-2(g) are close to the
corresponding maximum flows. We report the travel time for each passenger under the
UCDP mechanism in Fig. 6-2(h). At equilibrium, we expect that all passengers will
report their true maximum tolerated travel time due to the strategy-proof property
of the mechanism. The plot indicates that all passengers' preferences are satisfied
because their allocated travel times are always less than their maximum tolerated
travel times. We also notice that their allocated travel times are generally different
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Figure 6-2: Performance of the UCDP mechanism when the demand is 970 v/h.
from the announced minimum times. In addition, the travel time under the UCDP
mechanism in Fig. 6-2(h) is about 0.14 hours, which is about 5.7 times faster than
the UE performance in Fig. 6-2(d). Overall, the results show that the mechanism is
able to maintain congestion-free traffic flows on all links, and thus nobody needs to
use public transportation in this case.
When the demand flow rate is increased to 1500 v/h, under UE setting, as shown
in Fig. 6-3(a), the network rapidly becomes congested and 77% of passengers need
to use public transportation. In contrast, under the UCDP mechanism, Fig. 6-3(b)
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shows that passenger travel time is maintained at good level and only 26% of people
need to shift to public transportation.
We recall that the mechanism use tolls to incentivize passengers to reveal their
true maximum tolerated travel time. The dynamic tolls, generalized costs (negation
of utilities), and benefits for passengers in case the demand is 970 v/h are shown
in Fig. 6-4. We emphasize that, at equilibrium, all passengers' generalized cost are
minimized.
To compare the performance of the UCDP mechanism with SO performance when
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Figure 6-5: Performance of UCDP mechanism in comparison with the SO perfor-
mance.
the demand is 970 v/h, we plot the ratio of the total travel time of all passengers in the
network when UCDP is used to the total travel time of all passengers when they are
coordinated in a socially optimal way in Fig. 6-5(a). The value of UCDP total travel
time and the difference between total travel time in UCDP and SO cases are depicted
in Fig. 6-5(b). The two plots indicate that UCDP performance is very close to the
SO performance in this experiment. We note that as total demand (A, 970v/h)
is less than total maximum traffic flows (1187.5 v/h) on the three routes, at SO
state, there is no congestion. Thus, we emphasize that in UCDP mechanism, we have
achieved near SO performance without congestion and at the same time satisfied all
passengers' preferences. This observation highlights the game-theoretic aspect of the
UCDP mechanism and how the mechanism allocates near SO paths at equilibrium.
6.2 General Network with a Bottleneck
In the second experiment, we demonstrate how the road authority uses the UCDP
mechanism to control the traffic flows when road conditions change over time. We
consider a general road network, in which link (2,3) is a bottleneck, as shown in
Fig. 6-6 with the specifications in Table 6.2. Passengers can go from vertex 0 to 1
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Table 6.2: Network specifications for Fig. 6-6
Link L(km) vrnax(km/h) Kc(veh./km) F"max(veh./h)
01, 45 7 60.0 25.0 750.0
23 2 120.0 [20.0] 10.0 600.0 [100.0]
others 1.5 30.0 35.0 525.0
or vertex 4 to 5 directly or through the bottleneck, which is shorter. From the table,
link (2,3) has the normal maximum speed 120 km/h, but when the link is disrupted,
the maximum speed is 20 km/h. There are two demand flows from vertex 0 to vertex
1 and from vertex 4 to vertex 5, each with rate 400 passengers per hour. We assume
that value of time for passengers is 10 USD/h. In normal operation, value of time
of the road authority is 100 USD/h, but when the link (2,3) is disrupted, the road
authority's value of time for link (2,3) is 400 USD/h.
In Fig. 6-7(a)-6-7(c), we show the road network condition over time when the
disruption period is from time instant 2.4 to time instant 5.1. As we can see from
the density and traffic flow plots, when the disruption occurs, passengers are rerouted
to links (0,1) and (4,5). When the link (2,3) is recovered, traffic flows are quickly
restored to the normal operation under the UCDP mechanism. Finally, we show the
how tolls vary through this disruption in Fig. 6-7(d). As we can see, a majority of
passengers is assigned longer paths with lower tolls, and a small fraction of passengers
use link (2,3) in their allocated paths with higher tolls. This result reflects the effect
of the authority's value of time for link (2,3) under disruption on the distribution of
passengers in the road network.
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Figure 6-7: Results for the UCDP mechanism on the general network in Fig. 6-6
under traffic disruption. During the disruption period, from time instant 2.4 to time
instant 5.1, traffic flows are rerouted to undisrupted paths. The road authority uses
his value of time to affect the traffic distribution and tolls.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this chapter, we summarize the motivation and objectives of this thesis, the research
conducted in this thesis, and the key contributions. We also present several directions
for future research.
7.1 Summary
The optimal dynamic traffic routing problem for urban transportation network is con-
sidered computationally hard due to its combinatorial nature and its game-theoretic
aspects. As transportation networks are complex large-scale systems, designing a
real-time traffic routing system that can assign suitable paths to a large number
of passengers poses a great challenge to researchers. In addition, selfish and un-
predictable travel behavior of drivers make it extremely difficult to enforce them to
follow the routing system as well as to foresee potential congested roads. Furthermore,
researchers also have concerns about the efficiency of the system as well as the fair-
ness issues arising from heterogeneous classes of passengers. Traditional approaches
such as static and dynamic traffic assignment as well as heuristic congestion pricing
schemes in real-world deployment do not fully address the above challenges. As a
result, we are motivated to explore a novel approach to overcome the computational
complexity and satisfy game-theoretic requirements of the problem.
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This thesis proposes a novel mechanism called User-Centric Dynamic Pricing
(UCDP) based on recent advances in algorithmic mechanism design. The mechanism
is applicable, for example, in one-way car rental systems, or mobility-on-demand sys-
tems consisting of autonomous cars in future cities. In the mechanism, these services
are designed to work with public transportation systems. The mechanism provides
a simple protocol for each passenger to interact directly with a road authority and
indirectly with other passengers when the passenger wants to join the traffic. The
passenger first requests to travel from an origin to a destination. Based on the cur-
rent network condition, the UCDP mechanism can either suggest him to use public
transportation or the road network. In the latter case, the passenger reports his
maximum tolerated travel time within the lower bound announced publicly by the
road authority. The mechanism then assigns him a path that satisfies his travel time
preference while maximizing sequential social surplus and ensuring that congestion
does not happen. The mechanism also computes a toll that the passenger should
pay to use his assigned path. Unlike other approaches that attempt to compute
the path allocation for all drivers at the same time, the UCDP mechanism consid-
ers drivers in sequence to reduce the computational complexity of the problem. We
have carefully designed algorithms to compute the allocation rule and payment rule
so that the mechanism addresses both computational tractability and game-theoretic
requirements of the optimal traffic routing problem.
This thesis has the following key contributions. First, the proposed UCDP mech-
anism is efficient, because it achieves maximum sequential social surplus and prevents
congestion. At the same time, the mechanism is user-centric in the sense that it ex-
plicitly focuses on each passenger's travel preference and fairness among individuals.
Therefore, the resulting routing system is pleasant and easy to use from passengers'
perspective. More importantly, the mechanism is proved to be incentive compatible,
i.e. passengers are always better off to report their true traveling time tolerance.
Second, the mechanism can be applied for general networks having multiple OD pairs
with dynamic flows of heterogeneous users in a computationally efficient way. The
enabling technical idea lies in the new fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP)
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problem with a special structure that enables polynomial time computation of path
allocation. Third, to the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first in the literature
of transportation that considers general road networks with dynamic flows of hetero-
geneous users and addresses system efficiency, fairness among passengers as well as
computational complexity issues at the same time. These properties of the UCDP
mechanism are justified through our analysis and experimental results. Furthermore,
viewed from a broader perspective, this novel mechanism equips governments with
instruments to achieve sustainable transportation systems by alleviating urban con-
gestion and addressing related social and environmental impacts.
7.2 Future Directions
The extension of this thesis is broad. Several directions for future work are presented
here based on our insights gained from this research. More specifically, we would like
to investigate the individual rationality aspect of the mechanism, consider multiple
travel preferences and design distributed versions of the UCDP mechanism to deal
with scalability issues.
First, we want to incorporate individual rationality (IR) in our work so that
passengers will naturally join our system. This direction will remove our assumption
on IR in this work. Our intended method is based on the following observation. As
we have mentioned in the review of VCG mechanism in Section 2.4.3, if the utility of
passengers are always non-negative, they do not suffer any loss to join the mechanism.
Thus, passengers are willing to join the mechanism. To enable such a scenario, we
can offer reward points for passengers who choose to participate in our system. Using
results in the theory of repeated games, we aim to show that joining the UCDP
mechanism is sustainable with reward points. At the policy making level, passengers'
cumulative reward points can be exchanged for tangible benefits such as tax deduction
or can be used to establish reputation.
Second, we aim to provide more travel options for passengers to choose from.
For examples, besides travel time preference, a passenger can also indicate his max-
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imum tolerated toll and specify his route preference. These problems can be formu-
lated as other constrained shortest path problems such as vertex constrained shortest
path problems with additional constraints. Although these problems have been well-
studied in the literature, designing allocation and payment algorithms for these pref-
erences as well as investigation their complexity is an interesting research direction
for future study.
Third, this thesis lays a foundation for future works on designing distributed mech-
anisms for optimal traffic routing to deal with scalability. In particular, we envision
a large-scale network consisting of mobile users who not only share real-time traf-
fic information but also collaborate with each other to achieve social-optimal traffic
flows through our future distributed mechanism. Our algorithms to allocate paths
and compute tolls in this work is highly suitable for distributed implementation. Fur-
thermore, we observe that most travel requests can be processed by using information
in the vicinity of OD pairs. Thus, dividing computation on several computers would
significantly reduce computation time for each request. We can further use approxi-
mation in these computations to obtain suitable solutions in shorter computing time.
Maintaining game-theoretic properties such as incentive compatibility and individual
rationality under this approximation is an open problem for future research. Lastly,
we would like to extend our mechanism so that it is applicable for road networks gov-
erned by not only the public sector but also the private sector. Designing distributed
versions of the UCDP mechanism with the participation of the private sector, whose
objective is to maximize revenue, poses great challenges for future research.
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